In this paper I argue that the topic of epistemic justification offers promising terrain for conceptual engineering. For one thing, standards of epistemic justification themselves (and the concepts that capture them) aim to address certain practical and theoretical needs, and there is a clear rationale for engineering standards (concepts) to best suit these needs. In addition, neither of the two problems that plague conceptual engineering proposals in other domains—the implementation problem and the change-of-subject problem—seem particularly worrisome in connection with the proposal to engineer epistemological concepts. But the proof will be in the pudding, and in the second half of this paper I propose an engineered concept of epistemic justification. While the concept I characterize here is decidedly non-standard, I argue that it is the one we should use, in that it does a better job than rivals at addressing the needs to which a concept of epistemic justification should be responsive.

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Engineering a Concept of Epistemic Justification

  • Sanford C. Goldberg

摘要

In this paper I argue that the topic of epistemic justification offers promising terrain for conceptual engineering. For one thing, standards of epistemic justification themselves (and the concepts that capture them) aim to address certain practical and theoretical needs, and there is a clear rationale for engineering standards (concepts) to best suit these needs. In addition, neither of the two problems that plague conceptual engineering proposals in other domains—the implementation problem and the change-of-subject problem—seem particularly worrisome in connection with the proposal to engineer epistemological concepts. But the proof will be in the pudding, and in the second half of this paper I propose an engineered concept of epistemic justification. While the concept I characterize here is decidedly non-standard, I argue that it is the one we should use, in that it does a better job than rivals at addressing the needs to which a concept of epistemic justification should be responsive.