This chapter discusses the dilemma confronting those wanting to enter/remain in politics and the particular urgency of the relative risk of political impoverishment. For Aristotle, ‘it is evident that the city belongs to the class of things that exist by nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. He who is without a city, by reason of his own nature and not of some accident, is […] a poor sort of being […]’ (Aristotle, [350 BC]. Politics, 2009, 10). Aristotle’s sentence confirms the inevitability of the humanity-politics association. Moreover, it also poses the risk of impoverishment due to dehumanisation. Consequently, the challenge to which politics is confronted does not depend on the (impossible) overcoming of its ontological poverty but on the risk (apparently increasing in these times) of theoretical poverty. Politics is discovered based on an ontological law that imposes on man a constant movement through which theoretical effort must take place, thus passing from being a childlike self-affirming individual to its being, and always becoming, political through the encounter in and with the city and with and as the other. The problem arises regarding what it means to be political and what is the action, the effort, to which the individual is called to establish a relationship that escapes the risk of being a-political. What should be done to keep being and becoming political? Therefore, the theoretical poverty that politics risks suffering precisely consists of not knowing how to explain it in this regard. Theoretical poverty thus evokes the theme of the crisis/end of political ideologies and, at the same time, signals the need for a non-ideological but rather logical solution. The definition of proper logic in politics raises a debate that, recently, has seen a return to political theology, which, in turn, is accompanied by a return to the ethical debate. In this context, the political theory of Levinas provides elements of reflection as a valuable starting point for establishing the expectations and tools to fight against the impoverishment of politics and the defence of its corresponding relational property. In particular, beyond its ethical-theological foundation, Levinas’s political theory appears helpful in its specific analysis of the political relationship. The challenge to which politics must indeed be able to respond in present times concerns the reasons for and modalities with which to establish and always maintain that relationship or the relational property of politics. While supposing that politics consists of an ontological evolution, it is not clear the reason for and the modality for making the defence of such a condition an inevitable mistake, despite the best intentions one may have and pursue. To this end, Levinas’s notions of encounter with the face of others suggest considering not so much the importance of political action but of political re-action. In the constant political effort to overcome every infantile desire for absolute sovereignty, the relevant question concerns the modalities of relative sovereignty. It is therefore necessary to establish arguments for affirming the intrinsic value of relative sovereignty, that is, of that action which favours and allows the relationship between the ego (the self) and the other to be maintained. This action allows the ego’s monad to conceive and perceive itself increasingly as and in a plurality, thus actuating the movement of ontological evolution from monad to plurality. In this sense, relative sovereignty does not concern the action but rather the re-action. The man from the countryside is already doing, perhaps despite himself, a political action. When he finds out that to do so, he will have to make an effort (with some somewhat uncertain results) to abandon the balmy idea of self-affirmation and open up to the encounter, his reaction will be decisive. It is, therefore, the reaction to the discovery of the costs of politics as a relation to becoming decisive. The crossroads between two political and non-political paths are determined by this reaction and today’s problem—the pressing risk of theoretical poverty—concerns the difficulty in justifying the effort required to make and have a political re-action. The definition of political poverty inherent in the re-action of man who confronts the cost of the movement towards politics and its implications closes the first part of the book and opens the door to the discussion about the possible solution to this impoverishment and, therefore, to the alleviation of political poverty.