In this text, I reply to the other papers this volume, which include discussions of my work on fiction, metaontology, and modality. Regarding my artifactual theory of fiction, I respond to issues about the reference of fictional names, and discuss whether the artifactual theory of fictional characters I develop can be extended to characters in films, or to the theoretic entities of scientific theories. On metaontology, I defend my metaontological views about the ontology of art, and defend an easy ontology of facts, while also discussing what ontological discourse does for us. Finally, on the topic of metaphysical modality, I respond to accusations that my views about metaphysical modality unduly rule out substantive metaphysical debates, and discuss whether these views can be extended to handle counterfactuals and talk of possible worlds, and how they may be relevant to debates about the meanings of artifactual and natural kind terms.