Theories of civil-military relations substantiate a linkage between ineffective oversight and strategic failure. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) served as a primary oversight agent for the U.S. War in Afghanistan, with the mandate to report and recommend program improvements to the U.S. Congress and Executive Branch agencies. A variety of factors remanded the Afghanistan War to economy-of-force status after the initial defeat of the Taliban. By 2008, however, a devolving security situation caused then-U.S. President Barack Obama to export the “surge” strategy from Iraq to Afghanistan. This surge included a massive influx of stabilization resources, and a dedicated oversight agent was needed to audit the performance of the constitutive programs. Hence SIGAR. This chapter introduces the book’s research against the backdrop of the limited oversight regime that preceded SIGAR, the nature of operations in Afghanistan during the economy-of-force period, and then what changed after SIGAR was deployed.