This chapter reconstructs Francis Bacon’s understanding of the aim of his art, the nature of his artistic practice and his own agency, and examines its implications for the standard theory of action. Drawing on interviews with Bacon and developing several of Deleuze’s proposals in his monograph on Bacon, the chapter makes several claims. First, Bacon did not aim to paint determinate objects of experience or intentional content, but rather to “actualize” indeterminate, sub-representational sensation. Second, the relation between Bacon’s paintings and what the paintings are paintings of should thus be understood, not in terms of representation, but rather “expression.” Third, the expression of sub-representational sensation in Bacon’s paintings is inseparable from an experimental activity unfolding in a complex “expressive medium,” embracing the embodied, encultured and material dimensions of painterly practice. Fourth, because Bacon could not represent to himself the conditions of satisfaction constitutive of his intentional activity in advance of that activity, he understood them to be progressively specified in and through what is a self-consciously experimental, situated and medium-transforming process. Finally, I will conclude by considering the challenge that such an approach to artistic agency presents to standard theories of action and agency and outline a way to accommodate it. This will involve a reconsideration of the ontological and causal relations between intentions and actions, one’s epistemological access to the meaning and purpose of intentional activity and the temporality of intentional action.