Though utilitarians, like proponents of desert-based and meritocratic approaches, tolerate some degree of inequality, the justification for this tolerance differs significantly. For utilitarians, the moral fairness of a distributive system lies in its capacity to maximize overall utility—whether defined as happiness, well-being, or preference satisfaction. The social product, therefore, should be allocated in ways that generate “the greatest happiness for the greatest number,” to use Jeremy Bentham’s words. An ethically appealing aspect of this view is that resources are distributed according to individual preferences; for example, utilitarians might argue that avid readers should receive more books than those uninterested in reading. However, critics contend that this principle assumes all preferences are equally deserving of fulfillment. In reality, some desires—such as those related to smoking, excessive drinking, or gambling—can impose significant social costs. Allocating resources purely to satisfy preferences thus risks promoting harmful or socially detrimental behaviors. Moreover, utilitarianism’s focus on maximizing aggregate well-being often sidelines other moral concerns, such as merit, equal opportunity, and individual liberties. Consequently, this view has faced substantial criticism from philosophers across a range of ethical traditions.