The concept of harm is central to a liberal or antipaternalistic view, like the conception put forward by John Stuart Mill, with respect to justifying the use of criminal coercion. One of the foundational theses of antipaternalism is the idea that the exclusive or principal reason why the state can use coercion is to prevent harm to others. The other thesis, in brief, is that antipaternalism protects the autonomy, or sovereignty over mind and body, of rational individuals who are sufficiently free from coercive pressures. As we know, in Chap. 2 we defined the concept of moderate legal antipaternalism. This is the ethical political conception according to which the state, or an agent authorized by the state, does not have the right to use coercion against the wishes of an adult individual solely or primarily to prevent that individual, through action or omission, from causing what is regarded as a significant harm to themselves or from risking such harm, such as physical, psychophysical, or economic harm (thus undercutting their own good), if it is certain or likely that the wishes of this adult individual to engage in dangerous and/or harmful activities has been formed rationally, in a state of mental capacity, on the basis of a knowledge of the relevant facts, stably over time, and in a manner sufficiently free from coercive pressures. Even more so, the state obviously cannot limit the freedom of the individual if the action they wish to perform causes no harm to themselves. As already mentioned, according to the moderate antipaternalism expounded here, if the individual’s consent is not, in the specified sense, vitiated, their freedom of action can be limited, through coercion, only if it causes harm to others. This is the famous Harm to Others Principle developed by John Stuart Mill.