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This inquiry proposes that Peirce’s three levels of Logical Interpretants hasten abductive rationality. These levels are grounded squarely in Peirce’s categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. What spurs novel explanatory hypotheses rests initially upon a state of openness which permits receipt of phenomenological intelligence in Firstness (through creative hallucinations (1903: EP2:192). The process follows with haecceities in Secondness (noticed proximate objects and impulses in” now” time and “here” space) which initiate discrete feelings and implied predications. The Third Logical Interpretant regulates future conduct. Thirdness-based Logical Interpretants constitute not vague dispositions, but deterministic feelings of mind directing specific beliefs and actions. These new conjectures qualify as transsociations (1907: 5.476), which transform belief trajectories into plausible inferences, such that “a reconciliation or “an interadjustment between reason and experience” holds (1908: LI 392; MS 300). In short, Peirce’s Third Logical Interpretant illustrates his commitment to his pragmatistic maxim—incorporating the “would-be” as the summum bonum to entertain abductive promise.

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Peirce’s Logical Interpretants as Arbiters of New Courses of Belief and Action: Association, Transsociation, and Dissociation

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年

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  • Donna E. West

摘要

This inquiry proposes that Peirce’s three levels of Logical Interpretants hasten abductive rationality. These levels are grounded squarely in Peirce’s categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. What spurs novel explanatory hypotheses rests initially upon a state of openness which permits receipt of phenomenological intelligence in Firstness (through creative hallucinations (1903: EP2:192). The process follows with haecceities in Secondness (noticed proximate objects and impulses in” now” time and “here” space) which initiate discrete feelings and implied predications. The Third Logical Interpretant regulates future conduct. Thirdness-based Logical Interpretants constitute not vague dispositions, but deterministic feelings of mind directing specific beliefs and actions. These new conjectures qualify as transsociations (1907: 5.476), which transform belief trajectories into plausible inferences, such that “a reconciliation or “an interadjustment between reason and experience” holds (1908: LI 392; MS 300). In short, Peirce’s Third Logical Interpretant illustrates his commitment to his pragmatistic maxim—incorporating the “would-be” as the summum bonum to entertain abductive promise.