The distinction between normative arguments and normative judgements or statements has been developed as a reconstruction of Dworkin’s thesis that rules and principles are logically distinct types of norms. His approach that principles are reasons to be balanced against competing principles, whilst rules are applied in an all-or-nothing fashion, links a normtheoretical feature to a specific method of application. However, whether such a distinction is tenable is a matter of dispute. The most prominent attempt to present a structural distinction of rules and principles is Alexy’s account of principles as requirements of optimisation, in contrast to rules as definitive norms or as norms with a special prima facie character. However, Alexy’s approach is contested, and indeed it does not explain how principles can figure as reasons for balancing judgements. The prevailing opinion seems to be that there is no structural difference between rules and principles, but, if at all, only a gradual one.