This chapter looks back on four years of upheaval in Chile. It summarizes some of the main findings in this book and seeks to provide an account for the crisis through two central questions: how could a country once praised for its stability and institutional strength descend into mass unrest, and if constitutional change was the solution, how can the rejection of two proposed texts be understood? It begins by examining the structural and contextual conditions that eroded Chile’s institutional capacity long before the crisis erupted—years of political fragmentation, weakening party–voter linkages, and the steady loss of legitimacy had left the system too brittle to manage mounting demands. These vulnerabilities were further intensified by generational turnover and the rise of rupturist discourse, transforming discontent into a call for foundational change. It then analyzes the political dynamics that led to the failure of both constitutional conventions. The first, shaped by ideological ambition and a new generation of outsiders, produced a draft many saw as too radical and experimental. The second, more measured in tone and substance, nevertheless failed to inspire trust or mobilize support. In both cases, the problem was not simply the proposals themselves, but the inability of the political system to recover legitimacy and credibly channel reform. This chapter suggests that Chile’s problem was not resistance to change, but a fundamental misdiagnosis that created a widespread sense of urgency for transformation, when no such transformation may have been truly necessary.