This chapter turns to an examination and legal evaluation of the “Building Blocks” drafted by the Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group. It explains why these are not an appropriate solution. Furthermore, it analyzes why the alternative interpretation of Article II of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, as reflected in the so-called Artemis Accords (bilateral agreements between the US and various other countries), cannot—at least at this stage—offer a solution that is uniformly accepted by the international community. Finally, reference is made to the International Lunar Research Station (a joint project by Russia and China, involving other States as well), which, however, does not appear to address the commercial exploitation of space mineral resources.

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Uncertainty of the Next Step #3: Exploring Appropriate Responses Through International Instruments and Projects

  • George D. Kyriakopoulos

摘要

This chapter turns to an examination and legal evaluation of the “Building Blocks” drafted by the Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group. It explains why these are not an appropriate solution. Furthermore, it analyzes why the alternative interpretation of Article II of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, as reflected in the so-called Artemis Accords (bilateral agreements between the US and various other countries), cannot—at least at this stage—offer a solution that is uniformly accepted by the international community. Finally, reference is made to the International Lunar Research Station (a joint project by Russia and China, involving other States as well), which, however, does not appear to address the commercial exploitation of space mineral resources.