This chapter identifies subnational public appointment practices in Mexico by examining how appointment processes and procedures are structured in state constitutions. We argue that appointments are complex at both the federal and state levels. A hermeneutic analysis of the 32 state constitutions was carried out across six special public entities representing the three branches of government and autonomous constitutional bodies. The findings reveal a diversity of appointment mechanisms resulting from the country’s federal configuration, which allows states to assume these responsibilities, further shaped by local political dynamics that enable varying degrees of state capture. Our results indicate that transparency commissions tend to have clearer and more open appointment processes, whereas the judiciary retains greater discretion.

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Avoiding the Capture of Local Institutions: Comparative Analysis of Subnational Legislation on Special Public Appointments in Mexico

  • David Gómez-Álvarez,
  • John-Alejandro Pulgarín-Franco

摘要

This chapter identifies subnational public appointment practices in Mexico by examining how appointment processes and procedures are structured in state constitutions. We argue that appointments are complex at both the federal and state levels. A hermeneutic analysis of the 32 state constitutions was carried out across six special public entities representing the three branches of government and autonomous constitutional bodies. The findings reveal a diversity of appointment mechanisms resulting from the country’s federal configuration, which allows states to assume these responsibilities, further shaped by local political dynamics that enable varying degrees of state capture. Our results indicate that transparency commissions tend to have clearer and more open appointment processes, whereas the judiciary retains greater discretion.