This chapter explores the intersections between free will skepticism, the emerging concept of neurorights, and the ethical implications of coercive nonconsensual moral neuroenhancements. Free will skepticism in general, and hard incompatibilism in particular, questions whether individuals have alternative possibilities and ultimate control—in the degrees required for free will and moral responsibility—in a deterministic or indeterministic universe. Then, upon the denial of free will, some might suggest that implementing coercive neurointerventions to prevent and correct deviant antisocial behavior is necessary or desirable. This discussion is crucial to neurorights, which aim to protect cognitive liberty and consent. However, this chapter argues that neurorights, as currently conceived, are inadequate and could be less protective and more regressive in terms of human rights. Therefore, a skeptical or a hard incompatibilist approach to free will should reconsider the debate on moral enhancements and neurorights, advocating for more humane perspectives aligned with penal neuroabolitionism, which advocates for the gradual abolition of criminal law and retributive punishment, while respecting human dignity, freedom of thought, bodily integrity, autonomy, and consent. This chapter rethinks future public criminal policies and radically challenges the way in which we currently fail to do justice.