A stalemate exists between two metaphysical models of freedom. Where sourcehood is a matter of acting in the right sort of way (e.g., autonomously or reasons-responsively) and leeway is a matter of being able to act otherwise in the right sort of way, leeway models hold that we act freely just in case we act with sourcehood and leeway. On the opposing side, source models hold that we act freely just in case we act with sourcehood. Exposing a false choice between these standard models, this essay develops a new metaphysical model of freedom: the dual model, which holds that we act freely just in case we act with sourcehood or leeway. On the Lehrerian (preference-based) specification developed, the dual model holds (roughly) that we act freely just in case we do what we prefer or are specifically able to do otherwise as we prefer. Providing greater explanatory power than standard models, the dual model effectively accounts for freedom in a wide variety of cases: those exhibiting both sourcehood and leeway, source cases (e.g., Frankfurt cases), leeway cases (e.g., weakness of will), and cases of unfreedom (e.g., compulsion and manipulation).