In my book An Essay on Free Will I present and defend several versions of the “Consequence Argument” for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. In his recent Ultimate Freedom: Beyond Free Will, Keith Lehrer gives two counter-arguments to the Consequence Argument—that is, arguments for the conclusion that the Consequence Argument is unsound. One of these counter-arguments (“Lehrer’s Principal Argument”) contends that one of the premises of the Consequence Argument—to wit, that no one is able to render false a law of nature—is false. I point out that an argument that is in all essentials Lehrer’s Principal Argument was considered and answered in An Essay on Free Will. Lehrer’s other counter-argument to the Consequence Argument is an argument for the conclusion that the Consequence Argument requires that if a person with free will is unable to render the laws of nature false, that person is able to render a statement about the past false. I explain why in my view he fails to show this.