In his forthcoming Ultimate Freedom: Beyond Free Will, Keith Lehrer offers an account of freedom which he calls “ultimate freedom.” Since Lehrer’s account offers only sufficient but not necessary conditions for freedom, it remains an open question as to whether actions that are overlooked by his account should also be considered free. In this essay, I will address this question by examining what concepts of freedom we have interests in endorsing for the purpose of practical reasoning. In my theoretical framework, when engaging in practical reasoning, we should endorse different concepts of freedom when we consider a potential action from a forward-looking perspective and when we consider a past action from a backward-looking perspective. In a nutshell, when we consider a potential action from a forward-looking perspective, a concept of freedom that we have interests in endorsing is one that can serve as an aspirational ideal. On the other hand, when we consider a past action from a backward-looking perspective, a concept of freedom that we have interests in endorsing is one that allows us to accept the ownership of the action and improve upon it. As I will argue, whether we consider a potential action from a forward-looking perspective or a past action from a backward-looking perspective, we have reasons to consider many actions outside the scope of Lehrer’s account of freedom free. Lehrer writes that his account of freedom “might be called…defensible freedom” (2024, 9). Accordingly, this essay is intended to offer a defense of what might be called “indefensible freedom”—a theoretical framework that allows actions outside Lehrer’s account of freedom to be considered free.