In Ultimate Freedom: Beyond Free Will, Keith Lehrer offers a defense of the consistency claim: the compatibility of freedom of choice and scientific laws covering all choice. Ultimate Freedom is also a book about scientific law and explanation, and Lehrer proposes a view in contrast to the covering-law model promoted by Carl Hempel. The covering-law model lends support to the determinism-explanation assumption: given determinism, there is an ultimate explanation of human choice and action in terms of factors beyond the agent’s control. The determinism-explanation assumption conflicts with the consistency claim. Using Lehrer’s theory of explanation, I provide reasons for rejecting the determinism-explanation assumption. I begin by examining accounts of explanation in general and the covering-law model in particular. Arguments and examples from Lehrer, supplemented with the work of Sylvain Bromberger, are used to critique the covering-law model and the determinism-explanation assumption. The determinism-explanation assumption is connected to the consequence argument for the incompatibility of determinism and freedom of choice. After contrasting Lehrer’s criticisms of the consequence argument with those of David Lewis and John Perry, I provide a summary of my results.