This paper proposes a new hybrid preference structure combining strength of preference and probabilistic preference within the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) for two Decision-Makers (DMs). This novel preference structure allows a DM to strongly or mildly prefer one state over another, or to express their preferences probabilistically. Four stability definitions \(\alpha \) -Nash, \(\alpha \) , \(\beta \) -General Metarationality, \(\alpha \) , \(\beta \) -Symmetric Metarationality, and \(\alpha \) , \(\beta \) , \(\gamma \) -Sequential Stability are extended to include general, strong and weak stabilities for conflicts with two DMs. The new preference structure, a combination of three-level strength of preference and probabilistic preference, provides a more flexible technique to express DMs’ relative preferences among states and is more comprehensive than existing models. A real-world water resource dispute is used to illustrate the process of identifying the hybrid preference structure. Discussions are made about the valuable strategic insights that are obtained when strength and probabilistic preferences are combined as a hybrid preference structure in conflict analysis.