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In this chapter, I deal with problems related to discussions of de se thoughts. The centre of the discussion is the use of the first person (in pronominals). The first person does not really offer a description of the person talked about (except for minimal descriptions related to gender morphology, used in certain languages) and usually comes with a perspectived view of the context. The difference between normal users and autistic children, in connection with the first person, is remarkable, since autistic subjects prefer to use definite descriptions or proper names rather than first personal pronominals. And this comes with a propensity for objectivity and a-contextuality. This is, without doubt, a pragmatic consideration that drives the use of first-person pronominals. Clearly, in non-pathological cases, use of an NP (e.g. a name) where a pronominal can be used, triggers a pragmatic inference of some kind, to be understood in relation to the situation of use. Normally, the use of a proper name, instead of the first-person pronominal, suggests that you are speaking in a de-personalized way, not from an egocentric point of view. In the initial part of this chapter, I deal with the unorthodox question whether there are similarities and differences between proper names and de se structure. Readers may be surprised to find out that de se structures are involved in learning names. Although I only broach such ideas, the reader may find a substantial section on this issue. This chapter deals with de se constructions and argues that reports of de se thoughts usually express a perspective from the first person and are transformations of ‘de se’ direct reports. The discussion is mixed with discussions about proper names and immunity to error through misidentification. Proper names seem to play an important role in such discussions because they, like descriptions, involve the possibility of error. It is not completely clear, however, what happens when a demonstrative is combined with a proper name. We certainly have a complex demonstrative which has properties of both demonstratives and proper names.

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Thinking, Expressing and Reporting ‘De Se’ Thoughts (and the Problem of Proper Names)

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年

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  • Alessandro Capone

摘要

In this chapter, I deal with problems related to discussions of de se thoughts. The centre of the discussion is the use of the first person (in pronominals). The first person does not really offer a description of the person talked about (except for minimal descriptions related to gender morphology, used in certain languages) and usually comes with a perspectived view of the context. The difference between normal users and autistic children, in connection with the first person, is remarkable, since autistic subjects prefer to use definite descriptions or proper names rather than first personal pronominals. And this comes with a propensity for objectivity and a-contextuality. This is, without doubt, a pragmatic consideration that drives the use of first-person pronominals. Clearly, in non-pathological cases, use of an NP (e.g. a name) where a pronominal can be used, triggers a pragmatic inference of some kind, to be understood in relation to the situation of use. Normally, the use of a proper name, instead of the first-person pronominal, suggests that you are speaking in a de-personalized way, not from an egocentric point of view. In the initial part of this chapter, I deal with the unorthodox question whether there are similarities and differences between proper names and de se structure. Readers may be surprised to find out that de se structures are involved in learning names. Although I only broach such ideas, the reader may find a substantial section on this issue. This chapter deals with de se constructions and argues that reports of de se thoughts usually express a perspective from the first person and are transformations of ‘de se’ direct reports. The discussion is mixed with discussions about proper names and immunity to error through misidentification. Proper names seem to play an important role in such discussions because they, like descriptions, involve the possibility of error. It is not completely clear, however, what happens when a demonstrative is combined with a proper name. We certainly have a complex demonstrative which has properties of both demonstratives and proper names.