Reflections on anger inevitably end up describing both a good and a bad form of anger, even if they relegate the name of “anger” only to the bad form. This is illustrated by examining Martha Nussbaum’s account of anger. The division is not merely a nominal one, however; it involves us in questions about what good anger looks like and how angry it is. Taking up Aristotelian concepts of virtue, justice, and judgment among others in offering a resource in the direction of framing a coherent theory of noble anger, which neither condemns anger nor justifies it all in the name of authentic beliefs. Judging anger as rightful or shameful required judgment rather than clear precise rules. We need to develop the appropriate virtues to make those judgments intellectually and to enact them. We need the right sense of justice in order to know when anger is truly appropriate and in what proportion; without this, our opinions about what is righteous anger will be flawed.