The current dominant view about logic is that there is a single paradigm of logic, logic as justification. According to it, logic is a means of justification and consists in a theory of deduction; the paradigm originated with Aristotle’s logic and its current form is mathematical logic; the latter includes Aristotle’s logic as a small fragment, it was created to justify mathematics by putting it on a firm foundation, and is adequate as a logic of justification. This paper, however, argues that this view is not valid. Aristotle’s logic does not belong to the paradigm of logic as justification, and mathematical logic is inadequate as a means of justification. In addition to the paradigm of logic as justification, there is the paradigm of logic as discovery. According to it, logic is a method of discovery and consists of the analytic method. The latter is adequate as a method of discovery, and hence also as a means of justification, because in the analytic method justification is part of discovery.