The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement established in Bosnia a multilevel, corporate consociational system combined with asymmetric federalism. In effect, Bosnia has become one of the “classic” cases of power-sharing. However, its consociational institutions, lacking partners in political actors, do not necessarily imply power-sharing practices. This has created an environment conducive to a range of political dysfunctionalities, which in turn give rise to inefficiencies and a governance paralysis. The chapter employs the neo-institutional perspective to examine the institutional–structural challenges inherent to the Bosnian consociational model and the local political actors, namely the spoilers, who are responsible for the abuse and exploitation of consociational institutions. Its purpose is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Bosnian political system and to illustrate that while structural challenges undoubtedly constitute a significant aspect of this evaluation, it is also imperative to take into account the role of political elites.