It is argued that it is wrong to contrast acting for a reason with behaving from a cause. Combining them connects how action is steered with how it is powered. Such an approach focuses on meaningfulness rather than meaning, while also recognising that action involves effort and imagination. Only the actor can know what they are doing, if ‘doing’ really does mean ‘acting’. Not that the actor will necessarily know all that they are doing, or indeed how or even why they are doing it. They may also be wrong about what they are doing, although they will necessarily be correct in describing what they are trying to do. Finally, consideration is given to two objections to dynamic interpretivism, these being that it resembles methodological individualism if not also psychological reductionism. These accusations are shown to be invalid as dynamic interpretivism does not involve reducing social phenomena to the actions of individuals, while a focus on intra-personal processes simply emphasises the importance of Weberian ‘subjective experience’. The central thrust of dynamic interpretivism is an attempt to shed light on the central problem of the sociological understanding of the origin of order at its most basic level: that of individual action.