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This chapter applies the analysis of equilibrium bidding behavior in first-price auctions from Chap. 2 to answer different questions. In Exercise 3.1, we measure the seller’s expected revenue in this auction format when bidders draw their valuations from a generic distribution function and then evaluate this expected revenue in the case that bidders’ valuations are uniformly distributed.

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First-Price Auctions: Extensions

  • 章节

  • 发表日期：

    2025年

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  • Pak-Sing Choi,
  • Felix Munoz-Garcia

摘要

This chapter applies the analysis of equilibrium bidding behavior in first-price auctions from Chap. 2 to answer different questions. In Exercise 3.1, we measure the seller’s expected revenue in this auction format when bidders draw their valuations from a generic distribution function and then evaluate this expected revenue in the case that bidders’ valuations are uniformly distributed.