The Moorean Meta-Argument
摘要
Chapter 7 synthesizes the book’s conclusions with a methodological argument inspired by G.E. Moore. The wrongness of necrophilia, bestiality, and (at least sibling) incest, as well as the goodness of procreative marital sex, should be understood as Moorean facts. Yet, as demonstrated in previous chapters, only natural law provides a cogent explanation of these facts. The progressive sexual norms embraced in the contemporary West—such as the permissibility of same-sex relations—are not plausibly Moorean. Given the strong epistemic justification for Moorean facts, moral theories that best explain them hold a significant advantage, even if there were some epistemic loss in rejecting progressive intuitions. Therefore, despite its opposition to contemporary mores, natural law should be regarded as ultimately more plausible than any competing moral framework.