Between Thinking Tools and Extended Minds: Is There Any Room for Natural Organs of Knowledge and Action?
摘要
This chapter explores the complex history of the interplay of thinking and tooling within the universe of the human mind by dwelling on the concept of natural organs of knowledge and action. A time-honored intellectual tradition, still largely prevalent in philosophical accounts of knowledge production, sees the pinnacle of human fulfilment and happiness as lying in disinterested and self-fueling states of mental contemplation, unobstructed by interferences coming from the regions of extra-mental reality. By focusing on such notions as thinking tools and extended minds, this chapter intends to reappraise, firstly, the instrumental character of knowledge and, secondly, to show that the matter of thinking is as important as its space. It explores the nexus of instrumentality and materiality by proposing a conceptual frame that may bridge the gap between thinkable matter and thinking matter. At the heart of my argument is the thesis that the action of thinking should be reincorporated into a new ontology of active matter, in which knowledge and action are seen as belonging to the cosmos in the first place, and only secondarily to homo sapiens. More specifically, by relying on a few historical examples of philosophical conceptualizations (plants, seeds, slaves and imagined bodies) and by using a loosely Aristotelian terminology, natural organs of knowledge and actions can be shown to inhabit an elusive and yet decisive area between thinking tools and mechanical automata. In their most radical instantiation, though, and as a possibility that is likely to be developed in the near future, natural organs of knowledge and action can even be envisioned as thinking objects in their own right: from natural tools of thinking, these organs may be upgraded to objects capable of thinking.