Whistleblowing is increasingly accepted as an important prosocial activity which alerts society and organizations to misconduct. However, whistleblowers risk reprisal when they speak up, which deters the disclosure of wrongdoing. Recognizing this, Canadian federal and provincial governments have legislated whistleblower protections for public-sector workers. Unfortunately, the performance of the resulting regimes is contested. This may arise from the fact that there appears to have been minimal consideration of how whistleblowing systems interact with their institutional environments. This chapter uses “theories of change” to explore how Canadian whistleblowing laws are expected to achieve their objectives. It finds that Canadian whistleblowing regimes have two primary causal pathways: investigation and correction of wrongdoing and protection of disclosers. Senior administrative officials, however, have shaped and implemented the regimes in ways that conform to the existing institutional norms, conventions, and incentives to which they have become accustomed. This resulted in systems which favor the correction of wrongdoing and the rights of senior officials over the protection of whistleblowers. Thus, regime logic is weakened from the outset, undermining trust, use, and effectiveness.