In this paper, we offer a novel account of epistemic priority, which we dub “inquisitive due diligence.” We then show how our account both outperforms the two prominent species of epistemic priority—Douglas’s inductive risk account and Steel’s values-in-science account—while also rebutting objections from the leading critic of epistemic priority, the infamous Matthew J. Brown. We illustrate these points using examples from segregation research in the 1980s.

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Inquiry and Epistemic Priority: Lessons from Segregation Research

  • Kareem Khalifa,
  • Jared Millson,
  • Mark Risjord

摘要

In this paper, we offer a novel account of epistemic priority, which we dub “inquisitive due diligence.” We then show how our account both outperforms the two prominent species of epistemic priority—Douglas’s inductive risk account and Steel’s values-in-science account—while also rebutting objections from the leading critic of epistemic priority, the infamous Matthew J. Brown. We illustrate these points using examples from segregation research in the 1980s.