Matt Brown’s Science and Moral Imagination (2020) offers a groundbreaking pragmatic pluralist theory of values, challenging the traditional value-free ideal in scientific inquiry. Drawing from American pragmatism and feminist philosophy, Brown argues for the cognitive status and evidential warrant of values in science. Despite its many virtues, in this chapter, I highlight some issues faced by this account, stemming from Brown’s focus on individual scientists and the significant impact of the commercialization of science on research practices. The transition to privately funded research has influenced methodological choices and the integrity of scientific values, leading us to a dilemma. We could acknowledge that scientific practice has notably evolved to align with the commercial objectives of private companies, potentially necessitating a redefinition of scientific values. Alternatively, we could assert that commercialized science is dysfunctional, questioning the integrity of a vast quantity of contemporary scientific research. I conclude by pressing for the inclusion of the broader social context of science and its commercial influences in order to address the dilemma and develop a comprehensive theory of values in science.

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Brown’s Pragmatic Theory of Values and the Challenges of Commercial Science

  • Manuela Fernández Pinto

摘要

Matt Brown’s Science and Moral Imagination (2020) offers a groundbreaking pragmatic pluralist theory of values, challenging the traditional value-free ideal in scientific inquiry. Drawing from American pragmatism and feminist philosophy, Brown argues for the cognitive status and evidential warrant of values in science. Despite its many virtues, in this chapter, I highlight some issues faced by this account, stemming from Brown’s focus on individual scientists and the significant impact of the commercialization of science on research practices. The transition to privately funded research has influenced methodological choices and the integrity of scientific values, leading us to a dilemma. We could acknowledge that scientific practice has notably evolved to align with the commercial objectives of private companies, potentially necessitating a redefinition of scientific values. Alternatively, we could assert that commercialized science is dysfunctional, questioning the integrity of a vast quantity of contemporary scientific research. I conclude by pressing for the inclusion of the broader social context of science and its commercial influences in order to address the dilemma and develop a comprehensive theory of values in science.