It is widely acknowledged in the literature in social epistemology that knowledge has a social dimension: we are epistemically dependent upon one another for most of what we know. But what about understanding? Prominent authors argue that understanding is not social in the same way in which knowledge is. Others can put us in the position to understand, but when we understand something, this accomplishment is to be credited mainly if not entirely to us, as it is due to the successful exercise of our own cognitive abilitiesAbilitycognitive ability. In this chapter, I show that the social dimension of understanding closely resembles the social dimension of knowledge. I distinguish between three different ways in which an epistemic agent can depend upon another agent for a certain epistemic good. I then argue that all these kinds of epistemic dependenceEpistemic dependence apply to knowledge and understanding alike. If I am right, understanding is not (always) an achievement to be (mainly) credited to the single epistemic agent who understands.