The scope of the right to freedom of thought (RFoT) is controversial. Part of this relates to unclarity about the interpretation of “thought”. In recent work, I defended the Moderate view, maintaining that the RFoT protects thoughts that have a major impact of a person’s way of living, like political and philosophical thoughts. In this volume, Bublitz rejects the Moderate view, defends the Robust-scope view, and suggests a test of seriousness to determine whether interferences with “thought” infringe the RFoT. This reply aims to articulate common ground, clarify my argument, and identify ways forward for the interpretation and construction of the RFoT.

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

What Is Thought, or What Should It Be? Reply to Bublitz

  • Sjors Ligthart

摘要

The scope of the right to freedom of thought (RFoT) is controversial. Part of this relates to unclarity about the interpretation of “thought”. In recent work, I defended the Moderate view, maintaining that the RFoT protects thoughts that have a major impact of a person’s way of living, like political and philosophical thoughts. In this volume, Bublitz rejects the Moderate view, defends the Robust-scope view, and suggests a test of seriousness to determine whether interferences with “thought” infringe the RFoT. This reply aims to articulate common ground, clarify my argument, and identify ways forward for the interpretation and construction of the RFoT.