Blind signatures allow a user to obtain a signature from an issuer in a privacy-preserving way: the issuer neither learns the signed message, nor can link the signature to its issuance. The threshold version of blind signatures further splits the secret key among n issuers, and requires the user to obtain at least $$t\le n$$ of signature shares in order to derive the final signature. Security should then hold as long as at most $$t-1$$ issuers are corrupt. Security for blind signatures is expressed through the notion of one-more unforgeability and demands that an adversary must not be able to produce more signatures than what is considered trivial after its interactions with the honest issuer(s). While one-more unforgeability is well understood for the single-issuer setting, the situation is much less clear in the threshold case: due to the blind issuance, counting which interactions can yield a trivial signature is a challenging task. Existing works bypass that challenge by using simplified models that do not fully capture the expectations of the threshold setting. In this work, we study the security of threshold blind signatures, and propose a framework of one-more unforgeability notions where the adversary can corrupt $$c