By the conclusion of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire had been vanquished and was undergoing a process of disintegration. The Mudros Armistice, which marked the cessation of hostilities between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied powers in October 1918, represented the final phase of this disintegration. Subsequently, the Treaty of Sèvres, which followed the Armistice, served to formalize the Empire’s collapse. However, the National Independence Movement, which emerged in Anatolia from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire, rejected the proposed peace terms and established itself as an alternative government based in Ankara. The movement outlined its aspirations through the National Pact and achieved a significant victory over the Greek forces that had landed in Anatolia in 1919. This military success made it imperative to convene a peace conference, enabling the Ankara government to negotiate peace terms with the Allies on an equal footing. The Peace Treaty signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923, finalized the Turkish peace settlement, thereby resolving the centuries-old Eastern Question. While various works have been published on specific aspects of the Lausanne Conference, no comprehensive attempt has been made to examine this international event through the lens of Turkish and British primary sources. This paper seeks to explore the motives and strategies of Britain (London) and Ankara during the Lausanne Conference, as they sought to secure peace terms that aligned with their respective interests. The analysis will focus on the factors that influenced the attitudes of the delegations, the instructions they received from their respective foreign ministries, and the formulation of their negotiation strategies.