A recent stream of epistemology gives special relevance to ignorance within the framework of an epistemological theory. In this chapter, we argue that a particular sort of ignorance, which involves recognition of the fact that one is ignorant, is central to the acquisition of knowledge given the epistemic structure of society. It is clear, we hold, that Socrates realised the relevance of what we call ‘Socratic ignorance’ in the acquisition of knowledge and was aware of the division of epistemic and cognitive labour that we find in society. We shall explain the way we understand this Socratic ignorance, as opposed to what we will call ‘stubborn ignorance’ and the role this ignorance of Socratic overtones and related character traits can play in the acquisition of knowledge from others (specifically, testimony) and with others (specifically, ‘shared enquiry’). In particular, we argue that the intellectual virtues of humility and autonomy, exemplified in Socrates, are key to exploiting these divisions of labour.