Digital signatures are essential to secure digital communications, such as emails, documents, and transactions. Innovative signature techniques are being created to fend off quantum assaults as quantum computing develops. A compact lattice-based protocol that includes lower key and signature sizes was recently presented by Soni et al. However, after analysis, Pursharthi et al. expose a severe weakness, and they find that the signer’s key, which is intended for several uses, can be exposed by a single valid message-signature pair. To improve this, she proposed a countermeasure to secure the signature key and claimed that the signature key is now unobtainable even with several legitimate message-signature combinations. Thus, we analyze the Pursharthi et al. technique using cryptanalysis, which suggests that an attacker can obtain the signer’s secret key if even one legitimate message-signature pair is available. To address this issue, we provide a countermeasure that guarantees the signing key cannot be obtained even with numerous valid message signature combinations.