This chapter examines the response of the Western governments to Greece’s decision to withdraw from the military structure of NATO in August 1974, a subject that has received little scholarly attention. The Greek-Turkish crisis and Greece’s subsequent withdrawal did not spark the same degree of transatlantic controversy as the recent Yom Kippur War but certainly threatened the military and political underpinnings of the alliance and raised questions touching upon the transatlantic relationship and crucial security issues such as the future of US military presence in the Mediterranean and the very nature of NATO as a cohesive defence organization. It could be argued that although NATO failed to formulate a common strategy vis-à-vis Greece—and as a military alliance this was not its role—it succeeded in its primary aim, namely, to ensure that Athens would maintain as many ties with the Alliance as possible.

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NATO: Limiting the Damage

  • Ioannis Chalkos

摘要

This chapter examines the response of the Western governments to Greece’s decision to withdraw from the military structure of NATO in August 1974, a subject that has received little scholarly attention. The Greek-Turkish crisis and Greece’s subsequent withdrawal did not spark the same degree of transatlantic controversy as the recent Yom Kippur War but certainly threatened the military and political underpinnings of the alliance and raised questions touching upon the transatlantic relationship and crucial security issues such as the future of US military presence in the Mediterranean and the very nature of NATO as a cohesive defence organization. It could be argued that although NATO failed to formulate a common strategy vis-à-vis Greece—and as a military alliance this was not its role—it succeeded in its primary aim, namely, to ensure that Athens would maintain as many ties with the Alliance as possible.