This chapter outlines the main principles of Greece’s post-1974 foreign policy by focusing on the key figures who handled the country’s external affairs and on the analytical tools and concepts that shaped Greek decision-making. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus and Ankara’s claims on the Aegean shifted Greece’s strategic doctrine from the North (the Warsaw Pact) to the East (Turkey). The perceived ‘Turkish threat’ compelled Greek policymakers to broaden the horizons of Greek foreign policy, while the rising anti-American sentiment in Greek society threatened the country’s long-term commitment to the West. The Karamanlis governments (1974–1980), however, prioritized Greece’s full integration into the Western system, while simultaneously seeking to restructure the entire spectrum of Greece’s relations with the West and particularly balance its dependence on the US. The capstone of this policy would be Greece’s accession to the EEC, which, according to Greek policymakers, would not only secure the country’s political stability and economic and social prosperity in the long term, but also strengthen its political position vis-à-vis Turkey. At the same time, maintaining a close—but to the extent possible, balanced—relationship with the US was deemed essential for preserving the strategic equilibrium between Athens and Ankara. Greece’s strategy could be summarized as an effort to contain Turkey politically through deeper integration into the West.