In this chapter I bring Améry into dialogue with Friedrich Nietzsche, the philosopher whose concept of ressentiments Améry appropriates in his famous essay of the same name. I argue that Améry’s ressentiments have moral renewal as their aim, and this moral project is Améry’s sole hope of deliverance from the moral and existential loneliness imposed by his exile and dehumanisation. I conclude that the failure of this moral project further disillusions Améry and signals the limits of the existential philosophy he had so enthusiastically adopted. Crucially, Améry’s ressentiments blocks his access to the future and its corollary freedom and function as an implicit critique of the radical freedom and ideas of self-creation that lie at the heart of Sartre’s existentialism, paving the way towards an increasingly bleak and pessimistic view of the human condition in Améry’s later essays.