This chapter notes that the research was designed to test the ability of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and the framework of Edward W. Said’s Orientalism/Orientalism (1978) to analyze, describe, and (potentially) even predict U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis conflict. I examined declassified/unclassified archival documents, press releases, journalistic accounts, and published accounts and testimonials (e.g., auto/biographies, diaries, and congressional testimony) in order to discover and analyze the discourse of elite policymakers, defined as the U.S. President and associated foreign policy officials—Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, National Security Adviser, and elected members of the U.S. Congress (Senate and House). What this research showed was quite contrary to Orientalism’s expectations. Analyzing the discursive record for the “trigger words” that should be present if Orientalist frames were used in the making or applying of U.S. foreign policy resulted in conclusions that are not only largely unsupportive but, in some cases, detrimental to the theory.