The chapter focuses on the role of digital transparency—whether public officials are held accountable for their actions—on stability in developing countries, and whether increasing public accountability makes systems more or less stable. Digital transparency is said to be an important factor in improving public accountability, which helps increase the stability of systems. Using new data and case studies from less economically developed countries with a shorter history of democratic consolidation, the paper finds that external support is generally important in promoting accountability, but sometimes leads to instability. Increased horizontal accountability does not necessarily involve corruption, but it may cause officials to flee from the consequences. “To my knowledge,” the article concludes, “we know very little about the impact of external support for accountability on stability.” This requires more longitudinal and experimental studies. Episodes assessed as unstable include the usurpation of power by force (coup), destabilization of the ruling regimes (rebellion, extremism and unrest) or the end of democratic changes (counter-revolution). The authors note that “the assumption that increased accountability will lead to greater stability is not necessarily justified” and argue that while increased transparency and accountability can lead to improved stability, they can also lead to instability.

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The Impact of Digital Transparency on Public Accountability and Democratic Stability in Developing Nations

  • Al-Hareth Alhalalmeh

摘要

The chapter focuses on the role of digital transparency—whether public officials are held accountable for their actions—on stability in developing countries, and whether increasing public accountability makes systems more or less stable. Digital transparency is said to be an important factor in improving public accountability, which helps increase the stability of systems. Using new data and case studies from less economically developed countries with a shorter history of democratic consolidation, the paper finds that external support is generally important in promoting accountability, but sometimes leads to instability. Increased horizontal accountability does not necessarily involve corruption, but it may cause officials to flee from the consequences. “To my knowledge,” the article concludes, “we know very little about the impact of external support for accountability on stability.” This requires more longitudinal and experimental studies. Episodes assessed as unstable include the usurpation of power by force (coup), destabilization of the ruling regimes (rebellion, extremism and unrest) or the end of democratic changes (counter-revolution). The authors note that “the assumption that increased accountability will lead to greater stability is not necessarily justified” and argue that while increased transparency and accountability can lead to improved stability, they can also lead to instability.