This chapter defends the specious present by challenging a prominent contemporary variant of the cinematic view called the “Dynamic Snapshot Theory.” According to this theory, time-consciousness is structured as a series of instantaneous snapshots with dynamic qualities, rather than occupying an interval as in specious present models like extensionalism and retentionalism. Proponents of this theory have leaned on the waterfall illusion, a kind of motion aftereffect, for support and motivation. This chapter questions the dynamic snapshot theory’s evidentiary basis and challenges the interpretation of the waterfall illusion as a distinctively temporal phenomenon. When seen in the proper light, and along with the consideration of other evidence like the rare phenomenon of akinetopsia, we should instead think that the specious present is better grounded in the empirical data available to us. Furthermore, this chapter suggests, contrary to the position of the dynamic snapshot theory, that convincing accounts of temporal phenomenology in general will not be found in localized mechanisms but instead at the level of the cognitive and/or neural mechanisms responsible for consciousness more broadly.