This chapter is an examination of the problem of animal suffering in relation to soul-making theodicies. Soul-making theodicies have in common a commitment to the claim that God permits at least some instances of suffering because suffering, adversity, and trials are means by which one can come to develop in character and virtue. However, it has seemed ludicrous to some to suppose that the purpose of soul-making could account, in toto, for God’s permitting suffering, including animal suffering. In this chapter, I will first formulate two versions of arguments from (human and animal) suffering against the existence of God, and I will introduce soul-making theodicies. Next, I describe a soul-making theodicy that aims to undermine at least one premise of each argument, such that each argument is shown to be unsound or question-begging. Finally, I will set out the most common or prominent objections to soul-making theodicies—including the objection that they are powerless to account for animal suffering—and sketch how the defender of soul-making theodicies might respond to those objections.