Most theistic responses to the problem of animal suffering either include a rejection of phenomenal pain consciousness in non-human animals or the idea that the only way for God to create a world for humans was to utilize a lengthy evolutionary process involving non-human animal suffering. However, a neo-Thomistic response to the problem of animal suffering follows neither path. It includes an Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of non-human animal minds with a distinction between rational (human) and non-rational animal souls, both of which are assumed to possess phenomenal consciousness. And, while a neo-Thomistic response does make predictions about what kind of universe God would make, it does not include the idea that God must relinquish His sovereignty in nature. This chapter will summarize the neo-Thomistic theodicy discussed in Thomism and the Problem of Animal Suffering (2020) and then move beyond that discussion by emphasizing a major issue concerning the question of non-human animal minds and the implications a neo-Thomistic response has for animal ethics.