Optimal Design of Opaque Distribution Channels: Posted Price vs. Name-Your-Own Price Mechanisms
摘要
The issue of what kind of channel or channels to use in disposing of excess inventory or simply marketing products has recently drawn a lot of interest. This can be an important strategic management decision. In particular, the choice between opaque fixed price channels and name your own price channels or a combination thereof have recently been analyzed but a number of open questions remain: in particular, most of the papers on the subject make strong assumptions about buyer behavior which would not necessarily hold in practice. In this paper, a particular case--that of a monopolist with a large stock of goods and one type of customer--is investigated. However, in contrast to other approaches, no overly restrictive assumptions are made about buyer behavior. For this case, it is definitively shown that a combination of name-your-own-price and fixed-price channels is preferred to a fixed-price opaque channel which is sometimes suggested in the literature. The difference in expected revenues can be substantial.