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So far, I have developed reason structuralism philosophically and showed how it can naturally accommodate reasoning with reasons. In this chapter, I show how the formal approach developed in the preceding chapter can tackle meta-reasons, or reasons about reasons, by discussing some issues in the law. In particular, I will deal with the concept of precedential constraint in common law via the concept of reason as captured in my formal account.

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(Meta)Reasons in the Law

  • 章节

  • 发表日期：

    2025年

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  • Federico L. G. Faroldi

摘要

So far, I have developed reason structuralism philosophically and showed how it can naturally accommodate reasoning with reasons. In this chapter, I show how the formal approach developed in the preceding chapter can tackle meta-reasons, or reasons about reasons, by discussing some issues in the law. In particular, I will deal with the concept of precedential constraint in common law via the concept of reason as captured in my formal account.