The recently renewed interest in voter initiatives has rekindled a debate surrounding the primary beneficiaries of the voter initiative process. Matsusaka (J Econ Perspect 19(2):185–206, 2005) outlines the primary arguments on both sides of the debate. Proponents of the voter initiative argue that the voter initiative generally shifts political power away from interest groups and toward the median voter. According to this theory, the voter initiative gives the public a method to check the activities of legislatures that would otherwise tend to cater to narrow special interest groups. The voter initiative also provides an indirect threat to any decisions made by the legislature. The legislators may make decisions that are more aligned with the views of the median voter in order to avoid a possible future voter initiative that might be less favorable to the legislature.

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Do Voter Initiatives Affect the Interest Group Orientation of Government Spending?

  • Gregory M. Randolph

摘要

The recently renewed interest in voter initiatives has rekindled a debate surrounding the primary beneficiaries of the voter initiative process. Matsusaka (J Econ Perspect 19(2):185–206, 2005) outlines the primary arguments on both sides of the debate. Proponents of the voter initiative argue that the voter initiative generally shifts political power away from interest groups and toward the median voter. According to this theory, the voter initiative gives the public a method to check the activities of legislatures that would otherwise tend to cater to narrow special interest groups. The voter initiative also provides an indirect threat to any decisions made by the legislature. The legislators may make decisions that are more aligned with the views of the median voter in order to avoid a possible future voter initiative that might be less favorable to the legislature.