We present a key-recovery attack on DEFI, an efficient signature scheme proposed recently by Feussner and Semaev, and based on isotropic quadratic forms, borrowing from both multivariate and lattice cryptography. Our lattice-based attack is partially heuristic, but works on all proposed parameters: experimentally, it recovers the secret key in a few minutes, using less than ten (message,signature) pairs.

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

Cryptanalysis of an Efficient Signature Based on Isotropic Quadratic Forms

  • Henry Bambury,
  • Phong Q. Nguyen

摘要

We present a key-recovery attack on DEFI, an efficient signature scheme proposed recently by Feussner and Semaev, and based on isotropic quadratic forms, borrowing from both multivariate and lattice cryptography. Our lattice-based attack is partially heuristic, but works on all proposed parameters: experimentally, it recovers the secret key in a few minutes, using less than ten (message,signature) pairs.