The veto mechanism in the UNSC continues to be contentious due to its undemocratic nature within an international democratic institution and alleged abuse by the permanent members (“P5”) to promote their national interests at the expense of their mandate. Given the P5’s resistance to any modifications to institutional power, the veto is expected to continue obstructing the Council’s multilateral decision-making processes for the foreseeable future. Due to its inevitable continuity, a predictive methodology using random forest classification was employed to determine whether it is possible to accurately predict the use of the veto. Two permanent members—the United States (“U.S.”) and Russia—were analysed as they represent the most polarised permanent members of the Council. Three models were developed for each state: (1) resolution text-only predictors, (2) non-text predictors, and (3) a “merged” model. The models varied in their predictive capabilities, with the “merged” model for both the U.S. and Russia (with accuracies of 70% and 32%, respectively) proving the most robust. The strongest predictors for the U.S. relate to Israel and the Western hemisphere, while the strongest predictors for Russia relate to Syria, Russia, cross-border aid, and energy. These findings align with the historically observed patterns related to veto utilisation, including the strong consideration of national interests, ideologies, and strategic alliances when utilising the veto. A lack of overlap in predictors between the models indicates that veto use is based on highly subjective considerations, undermining the Council’s fundamental purpose of maintaining international peace and security through multilateral collaboration and cooperation. Therefore, veto reforms aimed at enlarging the number of veto wielders within the UNSC would be counterproductive to reestablishing Council legitimacy, increase the probability of deadlock, and accelerate the disintegration of any existing cooperation within the Council. Consequently, reforms should aim to restrict or abolish the veto entirely.

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A Crystal Ball for Great Power Plays? Predicting Council Vetoes Through Machine Learning

  • Breanna N. Cross

摘要

The veto mechanism in the UNSC continues to be contentious due to its undemocratic nature within an international democratic institution and alleged abuse by the permanent members (“P5”) to promote their national interests at the expense of their mandate. Given the P5’s resistance to any modifications to institutional power, the veto is expected to continue obstructing the Council’s multilateral decision-making processes for the foreseeable future. Due to its inevitable continuity, a predictive methodology using random forest classification was employed to determine whether it is possible to accurately predict the use of the veto. Two permanent members—the United States (“U.S.”) and Russia—were analysed as they represent the most polarised permanent members of the Council. Three models were developed for each state: (1) resolution text-only predictors, (2) non-text predictors, and (3) a “merged” model. The models varied in their predictive capabilities, with the “merged” model for both the U.S. and Russia (with accuracies of 70% and 32%, respectively) proving the most robust. The strongest predictors for the U.S. relate to Israel and the Western hemisphere, while the strongest predictors for Russia relate to Syria, Russia, cross-border aid, and energy. These findings align with the historically observed patterns related to veto utilisation, including the strong consideration of national interests, ideologies, and strategic alliances when utilising the veto. A lack of overlap in predictors between the models indicates that veto use is based on highly subjective considerations, undermining the Council’s fundamental purpose of maintaining international peace and security through multilateral collaboration and cooperation. Therefore, veto reforms aimed at enlarging the number of veto wielders within the UNSC would be counterproductive to reestablishing Council legitimacy, increase the probability of deadlock, and accelerate the disintegration of any existing cooperation within the Council. Consequently, reforms should aim to restrict or abolish the veto entirely.