In this study using a method based on Anderson’s functional theory of cognition, judgement of blame was studied with 124 participants divided into four groups; 31 children and 31 adolescents with mild intellectual disability (ID) and 31 children and 31 teenagers typically developing (TD). Participants had to judge social interactions between two characters in four situations: “intentional harm” (with bad intent-with bad consequence), “attempted harm” (with bad intent-without consequence), “accidental harm” (without bad intent-with bad consequence) and “no harm” (without bad intent-without bad consequence) within three different levels of aggressiveness (low, medium and high). Results showed that children, and primarily ID children, focus their judgement on the consequence but not on the intention. In contrast, TD teenagers judge the action according to the intention. TD children and teenagers with ID were able to judge according to the intention rather than according to the consequence, but not systematically, showing a developing stage. Only children with ID had difficulties in classifying deliberate action according to the level of aggressiveness: low, medium and high. This result suggests the implication of two systems: one evaluating the consequence of the actions that is not altered by intellectual disability; and the other evaluating the agent’s intention, based on Theory of Mind, which has not yet been attained in the young TD children and which is delayed in ID participants. This latter system appears to be correlated with intellectual development and age and confirms previous result showing that judgement based on intent depends on ToM.

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

Development of Intention-Based Moral Judgement in Children and Adolescents with and Without Intellectual Disability

  • Véronique Salvano Pardieu,
  • Valérie Pennequin

摘要

In this study using a method based on Anderson’s functional theory of cognition, judgement of blame was studied with 124 participants divided into four groups; 31 children and 31 adolescents with mild intellectual disability (ID) and 31 children and 31 teenagers typically developing (TD). Participants had to judge social interactions between two characters in four situations: “intentional harm” (with bad intent-with bad consequence), “attempted harm” (with bad intent-without consequence), “accidental harm” (without bad intent-with bad consequence) and “no harm” (without bad intent-without bad consequence) within three different levels of aggressiveness (low, medium and high). Results showed that children, and primarily ID children, focus their judgement on the consequence but not on the intention. In contrast, TD teenagers judge the action according to the intention. TD children and teenagers with ID were able to judge according to the intention rather than according to the consequence, but not systematically, showing a developing stage. Only children with ID had difficulties in classifying deliberate action according to the level of aggressiveness: low, medium and high. This result suggests the implication of two systems: one evaluating the consequence of the actions that is not altered by intellectual disability; and the other evaluating the agent’s intention, based on Theory of Mind, which has not yet been attained in the young TD children and which is delayed in ID participants. This latter system appears to be correlated with intellectual development and age and confirms previous result showing that judgement based on intent depends on ToM.