This chapter examines non-teleosemantic externalist approaches to mental representation, focusing on causal-informational semantics and Fodor’s asymmetric dependency theory. The analysis reveals fundamental limitations of attempting to ground mental content purely in causal or informational relations. Through detailed examination of Wisconsin-style semantics and its variants, the chapter demonstrates how these approaches fail to adequately solve the disjunction problem and cannot distinguish genuine misrepresentation from absence of representation. The discussion evaluates proposed solutions, including appeals to normal conditions and expert knowledge, showing how these ultimately presuppose rather than explain intentionality. Fodor’s asymmetric dependency theory, while more sophisticated, still cannot fully account for the cognitive nature of representational error or solve the hard problem of content. Using examples from cognitive science—including concept learning, mental imagery, and cognitive maps—the chapter illustrates why causal theories alone cannot naturalize intentionality or provide an adequate theory of mental content. The analysis concludes that externalist approaches focusing solely on reference and causal relations, while avoiding some pitfalls of internalism, cannot fully account for the nature of mental representation. This sets up the examination of truth-conditional externalist approaches in subsequent chapters.